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ABSTRACT 
For businesses, the traditional security approach is the hard-shell model: an organisation secures all its assets using a 
fixed security border, trusting the inside, and distrusting the outside. However, as technologies and business processes 
change, this model looses its attractiveness. In a networked world, “inside” and “outside” can no longer be clearly 
distinguished. The Jericho Forum - an industry consortium part of the Open Group – coined this process de-
perimeterisation and suggested an approach aimed at securing data rather than complete systems and infrastructures. We 
do not question the reality of de-perimeterisation; however, we believe that the existing analysis of the exact problem, as 
well as the usefulness of the proposed solutions have fallen short: first, there is no linear process of blurring boundaries, 
in which security mechanisms are placed at lower and lower levels, until they only surround data. To the contrary, we 
experience a cyclic process of connecting and disconnecting of systems. As conditions change, the basic trade-off 
between accountability and business opportunities is made (and should be made) every time again. Apart from that, data 
level security has several limitations to start with, and there is a big potential for solving security problems differently: by 
rearranging the responsibilities between businesses and individuals. The results of this analysis can be useful for security 
professionals who need to trade off different security mechanisms for their organisations and their information systems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
All need for security starts with the assumption that there is an asset that is potentially threatened by an 
“outside” influence. It needs to be protected. Because of this need, businesses define the policies that should 
be used to secure it and implement the necessary technical measures. However, such an approach is only 
possible if we can identify the asset, why we want to protect it and actually have the capabilities to do so. In a 
networked world, where systems are built on top of other systems, and interact with yet other ones, the 
precise asset can be hard to define, let alone secure through our own intervention. The Jericho Forum (2005) 
called the process of blurring boundaries de-perimeterisation and it poses significant security challenges to 
security professionals, whether they are designing or managing information systems. Solving the security 
problems caused by de-perimeterisation is hard, because new technologies are constantly being introduced 
that further blur the IT security landscape. Currently, mobile internet is becoming mainstream, and so is 
virtualisation - on the horizon cloud computing is already looming. 
In order to effectively secure today’s information systems and build the next generation securely, we need 
to understand how de-perimeterisation occurs. To this end, we analyse the process. Our analysis shows that 
de-perimeterisation is not a cumulative process towards more connected systems. Instead, we observe a 
cyclic process in which the basic trade-off between accountability and business opportunities are balanced 
based on risk assessments. In this process, there is no end result, where security mechanisms are mostly 
oriented at the data level as suggested. Data level security can indeed be beneficial, but also has limitations, 
which we discuss, and needs to be complemented by other technical mechanisms. After this analysis, in the 




According to the Jericho Forum, de-perimeterisation occurs when an organisation does not own or control its 
IT infrastructure or is not accountable for it, or when individuals are employed by more than one 
organisation. To this definition we want to add that de-perimeterisation also implies increased, flexible and 
often unknown connectivity between systems. This leads us to formulate three essential elements of de-
perimeterisation: 
• It involves different legal entities  
• It involves the creation of new connections between systems  
• These connections are undocumented or unknown  
De-perimeterisation threatens organisations in several ways. First, dependencies are obscured: in a networked 
world, it is not hard to create very complex systems of systems, which work flawlessly for some time. 
However, these systems have structural dependencies that only become apparent when something goes 
wrong. For example, in 2007, the Internet phone service Skype went offline for some time after a massive 
reboot of Windows machines, following an update (Saran 2007). Obviously, Skype was dependent on the 
patching process of Windows, but this was unknown before the event. As de-perimeterisation continues, such 
events can become more likely. 
Second, risk assessment becomes harder: existing methodologies, such as the Common Criteria (2006) 
use protection profiles for specifying security requirements, as well as the concept of target of evaluation, for 
the system for which the risk assessment is done. In many situations, networks of systems cannot be clearly 
defined - we might have some security requirements but we lack information about what kind of systems we 
are dependent upon. Thus, it is very difficult to do any kind of risk assessment when the boundaries between 
systems are blurred. 
   
Figure 1: trends according to the Jericho Forum. 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the Jericho Forum’s view of the historical development of de-perimeterisation 
(Jericho Forum 2007b, p.1). According to this model, the trend is toward more connectivity. However, we 
argue that the real trend is closer to an oscillation than to a straight line. If we examine the rise of the Internet, 
we can indeed find that once isolated systems of universities and businesses were connected. But this brought 
along security problems, and the networks were partly disconnected using firewalls. Over time, the internal 
organisational networks grew until they were too big to be secure: they had to be compartmentalised again. 
Finally, new technologies such as mobile devices and the service-oriented-architecture lead to new 
 
connections, and we can expect new security perimeters to be established for these in the future. This version 
of events is depicted in figure 2.  
  




























The oscillation is due to the interplay of two sets of opposing forces, one in the direction of connectivity 
(de-perimeterisation), and one in the direction of (re)-perimeterisation. The forces in the direction of 
connectivity include the desire for cost reduction, flexibility and speed of business, facilitated by 
technological developments. Enterprises see the advantages of e-business and open up their networks. 
Universities want to develop and utilise the new infrastructures for their own research. For many new 
technologies, their impact on security is not clear. Parties that are not aware of this, or do not consider it a 
problem (such as consumers), will take the risk and adopt the technologies. Thus, there is no incentive to 
invest early on in security features. 
Once technologies become mainstream, different forces come into play, leading to re-perimeterisation. 
Vulnerabilities will be found, and potential users will demand security features to be fitted to the new 
technology, before integrating it in their systems. Additional forces include the need for accountability, 
proper allocation of benefits in a business network, privacy, safety and reliability and company 
confidentiality. Our prediction is that this oscillatory trend, rather than the linear Jericho trend, will continue 
because none of these forces in play will go away. 
3. DATA-CENTRIC DE-PERIMETERISATION 
We will now discuss the applicability of data-centric security, and point out alternative approaches. 
3.1 Review and critique 
The Jericho forum has proposed to go with the flow of de-perimeterisation by placing a perimeter around 
the data, rather than around the entire infrastructure of the organisation (Palmer 2005, Jericho Forum 2007a). 
Several technical mechanisms are proposed in two key articles by Agrawal et al. (2002) and Grandison et 
al. (2007). There are several arguments for implementing security on the data itself. As stated by Grandison 
et al., security must be data-centric because only the data has real business value: the network of an 
organisation is of no serious concern if there is no sensitive data on it. A firewall is unnecessary if there is no 
risk of a security breach. 
 
Secondly, it does not make sense to have a security perimeter include more than is strictly necessary. In 
general, perimeters do not scale: if a system grows, the difference in security levels between the inside and 
the outside diminishes: on a network of 10 servers all of them could possibly be trusted, but this is not the 
case if the network is expanded to include a thousand servers. 
A third argument is about business opportunities. The Jericho Forum (2005) argued that organisation-
level security perimeters actually hinder business rather than facilitate it. To enable cooperation with other 
organisations it makes sense to facilitate access to IT assets at the lowest possible level, and use these assets 
as building blocks for new business constellations. Whether this is a good strategy depends on the potential 
risk versus the reward and should be subjected to a risk assessment. 
Fourthly, there are many situations in which organisations change shape, whereas the data will remain 
relatively stable. For example, a hospital might be reorganised and restructured many times, whereas the 
patients and their data will remain fixed. Putting security policies as the data level can be a form of future-
proofing security. Wherever the data will be in the future - it will be known how it should be secured. 
We identified several key forms of data-level security, which are listed below:  
• Data level security – database-centric 
The illustrative example here is the Hippocratic database (Agrawal, Kiernan, Srikant & Xu 2002), which 
takes its name from the Hippocratic oath that doctors must take to protect their patients and keep their 
information confidential. Ideally a database should adhere to the same principles. On top of it, other 
applications can be built.  
• Data level security - sticky policies 
In contrast to the Hippocratic databases, where the data is stored centrally, we can associated a data item 
with “sticky policies” (Bandhakavi, Zhang & Winslett 2006) that cannot be separated from the data, no 
matter where it goes. DRM technology can be considered an example of this scheme. Sticky policies 
usually require a trusted environment in which the data can flow; in the case of DRM this can be special 
hardware that prevents copying.  
• Data level security – encryption  
Another approach is to encrypt data inside the database such that it cannot be read or modified by 
unauthorised parties. This is actually one of the requirements of the PCI standard (2006, p.5) for credit 
card numbers. Users that need access to the data need a key to decrypt it. Some systems also make it 
possible to search through the data but these functions are usually limited. Encryption can also be 
combined with sticky policies: data can only be decrypted by those parties for which the appropriate 
access rights have been set in a policy (Cf. Cheung and Newport, 2007). 
Generally, there are three main issues with data-level security: 
1. Integrity and accountability checks at the organisational level remain necessary 
Support for security attributes such as integrity often requires perimeters around larger structures then data, 
sometimes even at the organisational level. As a practical example, consider the security system for a 
banking application: first, observe that data integrity cannot be determined at the level of individual bank 
accounts: if a sum of money is transferred, integrity is at least determined at the level of those accounts 
involved: the total amount of money before and after the transactions should be the same. In fact the expected 
level will be higher because we also must consider the interest that is generated by the two accounts and the 
time it takes to transfer the money between the two accounts. Finally, it is the bank that is accredited for 
performing financial transactions and it will be tempted to prove its security at the organisation level. For 
legal reasons alone, we need to know what is inside and what is outside of the organisation. This is an 
“undocumented” but essential function of the security perimeter. 
2. The security of data itself cannot be assessed at face value 
Data is always generated by applications and by users, whose interactions can be very complex. If we can 
only study the end result, we cannot assess how secure it is. We need to understand the computational and 
business processes that resulted in the data creation. 
3. Data needs to be exchanged with other systems 
Even if we can store data securely in a Hippocratic database, we will still need to export it at some time: in a 
networked world, communication of data with other organisations and individuals is a necessity. However, 
assessing the security of the other parties is beyond the capabilities of any database. Thus the problem of 
maintaining a secure data exchange cannot be addressed at the data level. 
 
3.2 Alternatives 
To place the usefulness of data centric security in context, and point out other approaches, we will now 
discuss several alternatives for data centric security mechanisms.  
Network perimeters 
Network or firewall security allows us to limit data flow between different systems, by inspecting and 
filtering the traffic that goes between them. There are two typical scenarios: in the first, we need to protect an 
asset against outside influences, in the second case, we want to prevent information from leaking into the 
environment. The Jericho Forum (2005) has argued for their abolition, claiming that they hinder business 
rather than support it. A general requirement for such forms of security is that the network infrastructure must 
be under control of the organisation. 
Endpoint perimeters 
Endpoint security dictates that all communication between nodes (endpoints) must be secured and that 
each node must be responsible for maintaining its own security. Policies for endpoints can be centrally 
managed. Forms of endpoint security are server and client firewalls, anti-virus software on client PCs, VPN 
and SSL/TLS connections. In the case when the network infrastructure is fragmented and communications 
between nodes are ad-hoc, endpoint security limits the security implications: the network (apart from 
reliability) does not have to be secured anymore. 
Ideally, each endpoint is a very simple system which is easy to secure. Unfortunately, for an end-user, an 
endpoint normally means a PC, which is so complicated that it is not reasonable to assume its security in 
many cases. It is also a single point of failure - once an endpoint is hacked, the security of the entire 
communication is breached. 
Multi-layer perimeters 
Some have argued that security can only be achieved by partitioning systems into different zones, each 
having different security levels, allowing for a defence-in-depth. Typically, the inner-most part is the best 
secured part. In situations where services are outsourced, this model can be extended (Walker 2005) to 
include an extended security perimeter. The reason for using multi-layer security is that there are distinct 
parts of a system or organisation that need to be better secured than others; while the parts that surround it are 
also under the control of the organisation. As such, it allows for defence-in-depth. The drawback of multi-
layered solutions is that they can become very complicated, especially when a layer has to be partitioned 
itself, for example because each business partner requires its own environment. 
Internet perimeter security 
A more radical (and currently only hypothetical) approach is to put a perimeter around the entire Internet. 
Such an approach is foreseen by Lessig (2006). “Ideally”, Internet access is restricted to those systems and 
individuals that have identified themselves properly. There have been a number of initiatives that would 
support such an architecture but so far, attempts to create even limited forms of identity layers (for example 
Microsoft Passport  (Microsoft 2008b)) have failed. With a functioning identity layer, trust becomes easier to 
organise, as organisations do not have to build the trust network themselves. The drawbacks are also clear: 
the entire infrastructure of the Internet would need to be changed, and privacy would be lost if everyone and 
every device is identified. 
4. ORGANISATIONAL RE-PERIMETERISATION 
In the previous section, we discussed technical solutions, their applications and limitations. These are not 
the only mechanisms for re-perimeterisation: because de-perimeterisation is a phenomenon that involves 
blurring the boundaries between organisations, the solutions can also involve the restructuring of the 
perimeters between organisations, and between organisations and individuals. 
 
4.1 Organisational re-perimeterisation 
With organisation re-perimeterisation, we try to partly undo some of the causes of de-perimeterisation. 
For example, when the management of applications was outsourced, it can be insourced again, and placed 
under control of the organisation. 
The main advantage of this approach is that it reduces the amount of legal parties involved. This 
perimeter type is typically used in financial institutions and governments. An important motivation for this 
approach is that certain risks are simply unacceptable and must always be treated, and cost is less of an issue. 
Organisational perimeterisation can be done on the condition that the organisation has control over its 
network and has the available expertise to maintain it. 
The biggest problems with this solution can be cost and lost business opportunities: it can be very 
difficult to manage applications properly; it required highly trained and expensive personnel. 
4.2 Individual perimeters 
An alternative to organisation level security is to make every individual responsible for keeping himself 
and his own devices secure (Cf. Hartel 2006). Generally, a system uses individual-centric security if the 
burden of maintaining security is put down on individual users. It can be argued that the only reason for 
centralised administrative control is when ownership does not coincide with individuals. If a person works on 
his own laptop on his own project, on his own document, in his own free time, there is a perfect match and no 
organisational security perimeter is needed: it would only complicate the situation. 
An example of individual-centric security is the usage of individual laptops and mobile phones: rather 
than having a uniform set of desktops in place, where everyone can login at any PC, organisations are now 
shifting towards a concept where users all have their own laptop. Some systems that store medical 
information also use individual-centric solutions, for example Microsoft Healthvault (Microsoft 2008a) or 
Google Health (Google 2008). Here individuals can manage their own medical information and decide 
themselves who will get access to these records (for example which doctor or which family member). 
The concept is not always applicable, for example when someone is assembling cars on a conveyor belt, 
or is doing a bank transaction for a company as an employee. Organisations are a natural way to structure 
economic activity (Cf. Coase 1937). It is impossible to think of building a passenger aeroplane alone. In such 
cases, individual centric security is at odds with organisational alignment. 
A specific disadvantage is that individual centric security has a tendency to mutate into other forms of 
security: in the healthcare domain for example, a medical file could be controlled by one patient, but he still 
has to give some authorisations to a hospital, because he cannot authorise all nurses individually. On social 
network sites, “organisational accounts” appear. For example, Warner Bros, a multi-billion dollar company, 
has its own user account on YouTube called “warnerbrosrecords”. This leads to the conceptual problem of 
which employee (or employees) of Warner Bros has access to this accounts, and whether user rights are 
managed by either Warner Bros or by YouTube. Another issue is that users can be incapable of securing their 
systems. It is already hard for a healthy individual to maintain her own laptop, install patches and configure 
the firewall, but it is even harder for a sick person to manage the authorisations to his medical file. 
4.3 Virtual organisation perimeters 
Concerning organisational perimeters, we can also create new structures, or so called virtual organisations 
(Mowshowitz 1997) between organisations, effectively reducing the amount of connections between different 
legal entities. Virtual organisation are extensively used is in grid computing, where separate institutions use 
resources from yet other organisations or even individuals. By combining the institutions into one virtual 
organisation, the resource owners only need to deal with one entity. Another typical case is in outsourcing 
relations, where a separate unit is created to monitor a service-level agreement. On the downside, virtual 
organisations require trust in the other parties and a virtual organisation is still yet another organisation, and 
can thus also introduce new complexity, because employees become a member of two organisations rather 
than just one. 
 
4.4 Federated perimeters 
Another solution direction is to use federated systems (Gebel 2005). If security cannot be addressed on 
the organisational level, it could be implemented at the inter-organisational level, by putting a security 
perimeter around multiple organisations. In a federated solution, several organisations agree to use a shared 
security solution, the features of which can be used by all participating organisations. 
Federated systems can especially help with identification and authorisation. If someone is identified at 
one organisation, he can use his credentials at another organisation. Just as with virtual organisations, the 
advantage of federated security is that the amount of connections between organisations can be reduced 
drastically. An example of a solution that supports federation is Microsoft’s Active Directory where 
management domains can exchange identify information. For federations to work, multiple organisations 
must come to some form of agreement and sometimes legal problems prevent information sharing. 
5. CONCLUSION 
We have defined the concept of de-perimeterisation and argued that it is not a steady process, but a cyclic 
one. In one cycle, different forces accelerate de-perimeterisation, after which other forces slow it down, 
leading to re-perimeterisation. There are basically two methods for “re-perimeterisation”:  
1. We can put technical security perimeters around different parts of IT: for example around data, 
around endpoints or try to use a multi-layered approach. 
2. We can re-arrange legal constructions: organisations can grab control of their own infrastructure, 
shift the responsibilities towards individuals, create new organisations or cooperate with existing entities. 
Each of these perimeters has its own advantages and disadvantages, which are outlined in figure 3. Together, 
the options provide a framework that IT and business architects can use for developing secure, re-
perimeterised solutions, which can survive in today’s networked world. 
  
Figure 3: mechanisms and requirements. 
Approach Re-perimeterisation mechanism Pre-Conditions Disadvantages  
Data - database-centric perimeter Communication less important than 
storage 
Mostly useful for 
confidentiality 
Data - sticky policies perimeter 
Environment is trusted Mostly useful for confidentiality  
Data - encryption perimeter Processing is less important than 
storage 
Mostly useful for 
confidentiality 
Endpoint perimeter  
Endpoints can be secured 
Introduces single point 
of failure 
Multi-layer perimeter  
Ability to manage complexity  
Increases complexity 
Technical 
Internet perimeter  Privacy and legal problems are 
solved  
Privacy is reduced 
Organisation perimeter  Expertise, control must be available Lost business 
opportunities 
Individual perimeter  Control and ownership rest by the 
individual, expertise  
Leads to complex 
workarounds 
Virtual organisation perimeter  
Cooperation and trust are possible 
Introduces new 
complexity 
Federation perimeter  
Cooperation and trust are possible 
Results in loss of control  
Organisational 




In the future, we would like to develop a more formal model of de-perimeterisation, which combines the 
technical and organizational perspectives. We also intend to link it to identity: one of the recurring problems 
 
in de-perimeterisation is identification. When organisations are cooperating, they lack context information 
and need to know with whom and with which IT systems they are dealing. This problem is also related to the 
emerging discipline of context-aware security (Cf. Neisse, Wegdam, and Van Sinderen, 2006). 
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